Warriors 2022-23 Season Post-Mortem: Roster Construction
The front office's folly in the summer of 2022
It has been a little over a week since the 2022-23 Golden State Warriors’ season finally concluded. The Warriors’ title defense petered out with a 21-point blowout loss in Game 6 of the second round at the hands of the 7-seed Lakers. As Steve Kerr said in his post-game presser, this was not a championship team. And, when expectations fall short, a post-mortem is needed. We’re going to break down the Warriors’ roster construction this year and discuss the most notable issues that contributed to a disappointing season.
After the confetti had been swept up and the championship parade hangovers had subsided, the Warriors top brass had plenty of decisions to make with their roster in the summer of 2022. The team had seven players who were set to become free agents. Those players were: Kevon Looney, Gary Payton II, Otto Porter Jr., Damion Lee, Juan Toscano-Anderson, Andre Iguodala and Nemanja Bjelica. Of those players, Looney, Porter Jr. and Payton II had contributed meaningful minutes in the Finals versus Boston.
To start, the front office made the correct decision to prioritize bringing back Kevon Looney, which they managed to do on a team-friendly contract. From there, things went sideways. They decided to pass on bringing back both Otto Porter Jr. and GPII after competing teams offered contracts that they considered too high. The team then allowed three veterans - Damion Lee, JTA, and Bjelica - to walk in free agency.
Those moves left five open roster spots to work with (the team gave Andre Iguodala space to consider retirement but left a spot open to him should he return). The Warriors had two draft picks in 2022: a late first-round pick and a second-round pick. The front office elected to keep both picks (Patrick Baldwin Jr. and Ryan Rollins) and sign them to guaranteed contracts. The Warriors then searched free agency for bargain options and came away with Donte DiVincenzo and JaMychal Green. Iguodala decided to come back for another season, so the Warriors kept him on a minimum contract. Finally, the front office elected to leave the final 15th spot open to save money on their salary cap tax bill. For a team that was looking to contend for a title and give their generational superstar the greatest possible chance at success, leaving the final roster spot open to was a curious decision.
The roster moves shook out like this:
Kevon Looney ————————> Re-signed
Andre Iguodala —————-——> Re-signed
Otto Porter Jr. ————————> JaMychal Green
Gary Payton II ————————> Donte DiVincenzo
Damion Lee —————————> Ryan Rollins (R)
Nemanja Bjelica ———————> Patrick Baldwin Jr. (R)
Juan Toscano-Anderson ————> Unfilled
That is a lot of activity for a team that just won the championship, and it begs the question, what was the underlying theme of their moves? The answer is a borderline delusional overconfidence in their young players on the roster along with a misunderstanding of the veterans’ importance.
If you have been following the Warriors for the years since Kevin Durant left, you will know that this has been building for some time. Joe Lacob and his posse have been leaning into a “two-timeline” strategy. The goal was to sustain winning by developing prospects as the core of Steph Curry, Draymond Green and Klay Thompson age out of their primes. That means in the summer of 2022 the front office was betting on Jordan Poole, James Wiseman, Jonathan Kuminga and Moses Moody to be meaningful contributors to a contending team in 2023. The problem? The young players are too young. Last summer, Poole was 23 years old, Wiseman was 21 years old, Kuminga was 19 years old and Moody was 19 years old, not to mention the newly drafted prospects who were 19 and 20 years old when they signed their contracts. These players have shown promise and may all end up being excellent NBA players, but in this season they lacked enough development, experience, and maturity to consistently contribute at a high level, especially in the playoffs. The front office was effectively replacing culture-setting veterans who played significant minutes all season with inexperienced players. Poole took a small step backwards this year after a good 2022 campaign. Kuminga and Moody were in and out of the rotation, never fully earning the trust of the coaching staff. Wiseman was not good and was eventually traded. Baldwin Jr. showed flashes but was clearly not ready to play any sort of playoff minutes. And Rollins appeared in just 12 games.
The front office’s veteran additions around the margins were less egregious, but ultimately most of them didn’t work out. With the lack of depth, retaining a 38 year old Andre Iguodala was not wise. He ended up playing in only eight total games this year. That spot could have been filled with an end-of-the bench minimum player like JTA who could contribute during the regular season. The two newcomers had mixed results. While I liked the idea at the time, JaMychal Green was not a great fit in the same way Otto Porter Jr. was in 2022. He had an up-and-down year with injuries, illnesses and inconsistent playing time. On the other hand, despite struggling in the playoffs, Donte DiVincenzo was a win for the front office. DiVincenzo played heavy regular season minutes, shot the ball well, defended at a high level and fit perfectly into Steve Kerr’s system.
As we all know, the Warriors struggled to establish a rhythm throughout the regular season. They were just 28-27 at the trade deadline on February 9th. It was clear their off-season plan had not panned out and that they needed to make a move. The Warriors traded James Wiseman to Detroit in a three-team deal that brought GPII back to the Warriors. This was a hugely symbolic move because it, in one fell swoop, admitted that the two-timeline plan was failing and that letting GPII leave in free agency was a mistake. Worse, it was finally an admission that James Wiseman, the vaunted #2 overall pick in the 2020 draft and owner Joe Lacob’s pet project, was clearly not the player the Warriors had envisioned him to be. Something that was less clear at the time of the trade was that targeting GPII specifically was also an admission that the coaching staff didn’t think Kuminga was ready for heavy on-ball defensive minutes, which is GPII’s specialty. Kuminga’s minutes increased in the last couple of months of the year because GPII was coming back from injury and Wiggins was away from the team for personal reasons. But, when both GPII and Wiggins were available in the playoffs, Kuminga completely fell out of the rotation.
The roster this season was clearly a downgrade from the championship team of the year before because of the organizations insistence on winning with extremely young players. It was apparent in the summer and became even more obvious throughout the season. That should be unacceptable for a team with a once-in-a-lifetime talent nearing the final stage of his career. The Wiseman trade was a step in the right direction, despite it being too little too late for this year. It was a clear departure from their two-timeline strategy and a signal that there is now, finally, only one timeline: the Steph Curry timeline.
Warriors 2022-23 Season Post-Mortem: Roster Construction
Hopefully the Warriors won't make the same mistake this off-season...